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The decision of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy to hold a
conference on Economic Analysis in the Teaching of Land Use
and Environmental Law presented a felicitous occasion to argue
the general case for the application of welfare economics to the
law of land use controls. The general argument will be supported
with a specific application to a problem where the relevance of
economic analysis is the subject of considerable debate. Zoning
change mechanisms which permit direct voter participation at
some stage of an administrative or legislative decision are the
subject of my substantive "lesson." The application of economic
analysis to consent ordinances and referenda was chosen because
these topics have not traditionally been perceived, as has been
nuisance law, as presenting important resource allocation prob-
lems. Thus, these topics offer an opportunity to extend the appli-
cation of economic analysis from property rights assignment to
more complex collective rights assignment situations. The topic
was also chosen because the relevance of economic analysis to
consent ordinances and referenda has recently been disputed if
not denied.
The paper is broken into three parts. Part I discusses the interest
of some land use scholars in economic analysis, as well as the
reasons leading to the recent Harvard-Oxford counterattack
against the law and economics movement generally. Part II argues
for the application of economic analysis by illustrating the inade-
quacy of the use of conventional constitutional and administrative
law doctrines as means of analyzing consent ordinances and refer-
enda. Part III is the heart of the paper and presents a constructive,
although tentative, argument for the use of economic analysis to
explain and improve the zoning process. My basic thesis is that
where the making of collective choices among competing land use
allocations is of concern, welfare economics theory is a useful,
and perhaps superior, starting point for the formation of legal rules.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
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I.
WHY LAW AND ECONOMICS
In the past decade, economic reasoning has been a dominant
intellectual influence on the younger generation of law teachers.'
Even those who are repelled by the seemingly narrow calculus of
interests which economic analysis takes into account have been
forced to confront welfare economics. Those of us who have
been attracted to economic analysis find that it offers a superior
and coherent theoretical explanation of societal organization rele-
vant to those areas of modern law which must deal with the messy
problem of the proper role of public regulation of private choice
when compared to alternative models of social control. The attrac-
tion of economics can perhaps be explained by an analogy between
two famous classical compositions-Bach's Goldberg Variations
and Mahler's last completed symphony, The Ninth-and two related
areas of law-land finance and land use controls. Like land finance
law, the Goldberg Variations are stately, sparkling, and innovative
but always within a well-bounded context. The law of mortgages
found its greatest expression in Glenn's great Victorian Treatise
on the Law of Mortgages. Land use controls is more like Mahler's
Ninth. The subject matter is intense but also banal, sometimes
coherent and deeply moving, but at other times chaotic, and un-
disciplined, always striving for something transcendent but not
fully articulated. Like Mahler, contemporary legal scholarship
was not adequate to address the important problems of societal
organization and resource allocation raised by post World War
II land use conflicts. Legal scholarship was either premised on
the nihilistic and pop-Freudian theory of legal realism or the
even more unfocused theory of liberal pragmatism which followed
it. Much land use scholarship simply reflects the theory that the
function of the legal system is only to remove "artificial" con-
1. See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CH. L. REv.
281 (1979). The function and limits of economic analysis and law are the subject
of some controversy, Professor Posner maintains that the primary role of
economic analysis is positive or scientific and that its function is to explain
behavior in the legal system. Legal behavior is in need of explanation and
economic analysis is a powerful tool to this end. But there is also a need to
develop new legal rules, and economic analysis can suggest the normative
objective and form of these rules. This paper is equally concerned with both
uses of law and economics, and like Professor Posner's work, cautions that
the normative need not flow from the positive.
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straints on public entities so that they will be free to do good.
When public entities did not do good as many defined the term,
for example by enacting zoning ordinances which substantially
raised the cost of entry into suburban communities, the only
answer legal scholarship could provide was a quick and simplistic
constitutional fix to cure an obvious wrong. There was little
serious effort to explain why cities behaved as they did or to
evaluate systematically the impacts of their policies.
Economic analysis, as developed by pioneers such as Henry
Manne, Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, offered a simple,
though not simplistic, model of human behavior. It provided both
a positive theory to explain private and public behavior, and the
basis for a normative theory against which legal rules could first
be tested. The core notion of law and economics, that the neo-
classical definition of efficiency is a positive standard by which
alternative resource allocations can be compared, is an especially
powerful one for lawyers. Cases are litigated both because of the
situations of the parties involved and because of underlying con-
flicts within society. Lawyers interested in analyzing the under-
lying conflicts and speculating about the proper role of the legal
system in resolving them, found economic analysis very attractive.
It provided a universal starting point for the derivation of a model
to test alternative resource allocations. Such a model was particu-
larly welcome in land use, which deals with intense conflicts among
alternative conceptions of property rights about which little con-
sensus exists as to the substantive results which the legal system
should promote. The law of land use controls is a patchy mixture
of constitutional law and statutory construction with a thin base of
common law or ultra vires notions. It is particularly sensitive to
the character of the jurisdiction in which the conflict arises, and
thus, no coherent core of general and widely accepted doctrine
has emerged. Whatever concepts the courts purport to follow are
so general as to be vacuous. At one time it was thought (or at
least hoped) that the work of the planning profession could pro-
vide the necessary "grundnorms" 2 but this hope proved illusory.
When one began to plumb what planners actually had to offer,
2. The term is usually translated from the German as "basic norms" and is
associated with the Austrian-American scholar, Hans Kelsen. See, e.g., Kelsen,
Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1128, 1140-51
(1965).
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the answer was "very little." The critical scholarship of those
interested in city planning such as Banfield, 3 Meyerson," Wilson5
and, later, Altshuler, 6 not only exposed the weaknesses of using
the work of planners as a basis for a law of land use controls, but
also raised important questions about the limits of public interven-
tion in the private market; a question which much legal scholar-
ship ignored. The stage was thus set for the emergence of the con-
temporary, positive and normative, law and economics movement.
The normative presumption of neo-classical welfare economics
is that the efficient allocation of resources should be promoted
unless there are substantial counter-considerations. There is an
important question which is always interposed to an argument that
efficiency promotion should be the primary objective of the law:
Why should efficiency be ranked above all other competing, and
seemingly more attractive values such as equfty, justice, wealth
redistribution and fairness? In land use controls, the answer is
perhaps easier than it is for some other areas.
The subject of land use controls is the proper level of public
regulation of the land development market, and the extent to
which public should be substituted for private choice. There is a
wide consensus among the players in the zoning game that the ob-
ject of public regulation or direct public development is the enhance-
ment of the efficient allocation of resources. The theories of justi-
fication for public regulation are generally based on crude theories
of market failure and the need to correct these failures to induce
efficiency where the unregulated market would not result in the
net efficient allocation of resources. The widely shared perception
that efficiency promotion is the objective makes it difficult to
argue that if other values (for example, income redistribution)
were ranked higher, land use regulation would be an effective
method of accomplishing the objective. Thus, it seems plausible
to rank efficiency as the primary goal of the legal system and to
review the other values as constraints which may operate appro-
priately in limited instances.
My argument has both a substantive and pedagogical dimen-
sion. In teaching land use controls at several schools, I have found
3. E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS (1963).
4. Meyerson, Building the Middle-Range Bridge for Comprehensive Planning,
22 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 58 (1956).
5. E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, supra note 3.
6. A. ALTSHULER, THE CITy PLANNING PROCESS (1965).
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that the consistent use of the goal of efficiency promotion as the
standard to evaluate the cases, statutes, and reform suggestions
is an effective method of teaching the course. The subject matter
quickly exposes a number of important value conflicts, and there
is a tendency on the part of students to express their preferences
in an unfocused and inarticulate manner. If law and economics
does nothing else, it forces students who wish to reject the lessons
of welfare economics to organize their arguments to take into
account more relevant considerations than they would without the
constant focus on efficiency. In short, I use economic analysis
pedagogically to shift the burden of proof to the students to dis-
lodge efficiency as the desired standard.
The substantive dimension to the argument is that society has
failed to appreciate the performance of the land development
market. American cities and their suburbs may not have the com-
pactness, charm and street life of many European cities, but the
market here has performed well in meeting the demand for com-
mercial and residential uses. If one accepts this premise, it would
seem to follow that one ought to have a sound reason for any kind
of public intervention in the market, especially for intervention
which withdraws land from the market or substantially increases
the cost of development. The adoption of efficiency promotion as
the primary goal requires a tightly reasoned case for public inter-
vention.
The case for public intervention in the real estate market rests
on two rationales which ultimately merge. The first is the presence
of external costs which are not minimized through private bar-
gains. The second is the inability to organize a market, again be-
cause of high transaction costs, to provide public goods at a level
for which a demand exists. From a purely analytical perspective,
both the problems of externality control and public good provision
can be the same. The elimination of a bad is the provision of a
good.' The justification for regulations which eliminate bads and
those which seek to provide goods is the same-the promotion of
efficiency. However, it is useful to distinguish between the reduc-
tion of "negative" externalities and the provision of "positive"
externalities (public goods). The case for public intervention may
be very different depending on whether the problem is the need for
the elimination of a "bad" or the provision of a "good."
7. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (1967).
19801
36 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 1:31
The distinction between "bads" and "goods" is a very con-
troversial, but valid, one. Take, for example, the issue of the proper
growth rate for a city. Are those who seek to restrict growth merely
demanding that new development not cause "bads," such as in-
creased congestion and potential pollution, or are growth control
proponents asking for a "good," such as the provision of more
open space and a high level of amenity in the community? The
characterization of an activity is important because we have gen-
erally made a distinction between the prevention of a "bad" and
the provision of a "good" in deciding who should bear the cost
of implementing the regulatory decision. Thus, this section con-
cludes with a suggested basis for distinction between "bads" and
"goods." The third section of this paper will suggest some conse-
quences this distinction has for the legal system, and will explain
why many of the issues assumed to be efficiency issues may not
be so at all.
Negative externalities or "bads" occur when one land use choice
reduces the use and enjoyment of another. According to Coase's
seminal aricle, The Problem of Social Cost,I if one party alleges
that a proximate land use injures the party because of the creation
of external costs, it is not proper to speak of one use causing
injury to another. Rather, it is necessary to recognize that causa-
tion is joint since the alleged adverse impacts are the result of
mutual incompatibilities between the two uses. Nevertheless,
causal relationships must be established. The concept of negative
externalities must be given normative content because the concept
of externality as used in welfare economics is not self-defining
for the law.
In the case of negative externalities, the law must decide who
must bear what costs and why. To make the concept of a "bad"
normative or operative, 9 it is necessary to distinguish between
normal and abnormal background levels of interference with one's
use and enjoyment of land. There is currently a lively debate as
to whether these normal and abnormal background levels should
be set by justice or by utilitarian criteria."0 The better answer is
that crude efficiency notions do and should play a substantial role
in setting background levels and, thus, in assigning property
8. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &EcoN. 1 (1960).
9. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cmi. L. REv. 681, 729-31 (1973).
10. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEcAL STuD. 49 (1979).
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rights whether by property or liability rules. Under justice or
utilitarian theories, it is necessary to speak of one use causing
negative externalities.
Not every disvalued impact from another's choice, land use or
otherwise, can be classified as a negative externality for the simple
reason that an impact free society would be a static society. Just
as economists attempt to distinguish between Pareto and non-Pareto
relevant externalities,"I the law must decide which externalities
are relevant (e.g., a basis for some form of public intervention),
and which are not. As the third section of this paper will illustrate,
the focus on relevant externalities can lead to some important
insights about the geographic scale of the problem and suggest
alternative institutional responses.
Positive externalities are generally defined as third party benefits
which accrue as a result of an action such as a land use choice.
If the benefits cannot be captured through a market by the person
providing the benefits, there is a danger that an efficient amount
of the "good" will not be produced through the market. The
failure of private collective action to furnish the "good" gener-
ally leads to a standard public goods justification for the public
provision of the "good."" Not only does the market failure
explanation provided by public goods theory provide a justifica-
tion for public intervention, but economists have had useful things
to say about the level and scale of public intervention, although
it must be admitted that the application of many proposed models
is ambiguous.
II.
THE LAW OF CONSENT ORDINANCES AND REFERENDA
All over the world, in the past two decades, neighborhood
groups have demanded the right of self-determination over the
pace and scale of land use change in their neighborhood or com-
munity as a whole.' 3 In the United States, however, the concept
of citizen self-determination and direct participation in land use
decisions is at variance with the traditional theory of land use regu-
lation. Zoning and other land use decisions are assumed to be
either legislative or administrative acts undertaken by bodies elected
11. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958).
12. M. OLSON, Tr LOGIC OF COLLEcTrvE ACTION (1965).
13. See G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT IN CROWDED PLACES, 11-38 (1979).
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through the representative process or appointed by elected repre-
sentatives. The criteria for the validity of an act is whether those
who did the act have a legitimate claim to exercise the power,
whether the act comports with constitutional or other self-imposed
procedural limitations, and whether the act is consistent with
whatever substantive standards the courts apply.
Zoning originated as a means of assigning public property rights
in the status quo to existing users. There have long been two direct
formal citizen participation change mechanisms in zoning. One is
consent ordinances. The other is initiatives and referenda. These
devices fell into disuse after World War II as courts viewed zoning
as a legislative or administrative act carefully considered, with
reliance on the expert advice of planners. With the loss of faith in
experts and in the political process generally, it is not surprising
that interest in direct voter participation has revived. However, the
case law is ill-prepared to deal with the increased use of these tech-
niques and to find alternative change accommodation devices
which can balance the somewhat inconsistent goals of direct voter
participation and efficiency promotion.
Consent ordinances and referenda and initiatives are conven-
tionally analyzed as delegation of power cases. At one time, it was
debatable whether or not a legislature could delegate to the state-
wide electorate the power to enact laws. Early cases struck down
such delegations on the ground that direct citizen approval of laws
was inconsistent with the concept of representative government.
This view has, however, been repudiated."
The cases upholding referenda and initiatives make two crucial
assumptions, both of which present problems when applied to
land use control decisions. First, it is assumed that the voters are
all the voters in some appropriate political unit, such as an entire
state or city. Second, it is assumed that the issues submitted to a
vote will be of general applicability. The courts have been troubled
by situations where the legislature has delegated the power to make
law to non-traditional political voting units and the delegation
has involved the right to make decisions which affect only the
self-interest of the members of the voting unit. A distinction has,
therefore, been drawn between general delegations to voters and
delegations to private parties, although analytically both are
simply the delegation, to some subunit of the public, of the power
to make law.
14. L. JAFEE, JUDICLAL CONTROL OF ADMNISTRATIVE ACTION, 52-53 (abr.
student ed. 1965).
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Consent ordinances and referenda and initiatives may be ana-
lytically classified as public or private delegations. Consent ordi-
nances delegate to small groups of property owners the power to
make laws directly affecting their self-interest, such as what uses
will be permitted, under what conditions, in the immediate area of
the group's jurisdiction. Referenda sometimes involve more gen-
eral issues, such as how much and at what rate a community
shall grow. They often involve matters of keen self-interest to a
small geographical segment of the community. Referenda over low
and moderate income housing projects fall into this category. The
Supreme Court has expressed its concern over private delegations
by framing the issue as one of due process; but the four important
Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue have been unable to
articulate a consistent rationale for the results and the Court's
resolution of the cases remains troubling.
Courts attempting to draw a line between valid and invalid
consent ordinances start from a distinction between two early
Supreme Court cases. The first, Eubank v. City of Richmond, I
held that an ordinance which allowed property owners in a desig-
nated area to establish a set-back line was an invalid delegation
of power to private parties because there were no standards set
to check the possible arbitrary exercise of power. Thomas Cusack
Co. v. City of Chicago,6 the second case, upheld an ordinance
which prohibited billboards in residential areas, but allowed a
majority of property owners on the block in which a billboard was
proposed to waive the prohibitions. Both ordinances gave prop-
erty owners affected by a proposed regulation the power to veto
the regulation. The Supreme Court thought the distinction be-
tween the two cases was "plain":
The former left the establishment of the building line untouched
until the lot owners should act and then made the street committee
the mere automatic register of that action and gave to it the effect
of law. The ordinance in the case at bar absolutely prohibits the
erection of any billboards in the blocks designated, but permits
this prohibition to be modified with the consent of the persons who
are to be most affected by such modification."
The distinction between an invalid "delegation of legislative
power," which permits a majority of property owners to impose a
restriction, and a valid "familiar provision affecting the enforce-
ment of laws and ordinances," which merely allows the removal
15. 226 U. S. 137 (1912).
16. 242 U. S. 526 (1917).
17. Id. at 531.
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of a previously imposed legislative restriction, is at best a difficult
one to grasp. Whatever merit there was to the distinction was
blurred twelve years later in the third of the Supreme Court's trio
of zoning consent cases, Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust
Co. v. Roberge. 18 Philanthropic homes for the young or old were
permitted in residential districts only if two thirds of the property
owners within 400 feet of the proposed location consented to the
proposed use. One could argue that this was Cusack; social service
institutions were prohibited unless accepted by those most affected
by the new use, but the court followed Eubank and held that the
Seattle ordinance was unconstitutional. One could attempt to
rationalize Cusack and Roberge by arguing that the recently de-
cided foundation zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Col9 changed
the delegation analysis applicable to cases such as Roberge. In Euclid,
Justice Sutherland grounded the city's power to segregate uses among
different districts on their likely offensive character. Roberge can be
seen as a case where the city failed to make the necessary "legisla-
tive determination that the proposed building would be inconsistent
with public health, safety, morals or general welfare." The Court
was concerned that without this finding there was a high risk that
neighborhood consent would be withheld arbitrarily. Cusack was
distinguished precisely on the ground that billboards "by reason
of their nature are likely to be offensive." However, this distinc-
tion does not wash because zoning is largely a validation of widely
shared social and cultural values. There are no objective criteria
to determine which uses are objectionable and which are not. Any
use may be disvalued in any given area and for this reason the dele-
gation analysis ought to remain constant regardless of the use at
issue. Courts must do more than simply make intuitive judgments
about which uses are likely to be offensive and which are not.
The Eubank, Cusack, Roberge trilogy all involved the problem
of the tyranny of the majority over a minority because the voting
unit was so small. The same problem arises if the voting unit is
larger, such as a municipality, if a single tract is subject to a refer-
enda. For this reason, courts have increasingly held that the rezon-
ing of a small tract is an adjudicative function, and thus the land-
owner is entitled to due process protections which preclude use
of the referenda."0 Due process considerations are weaker, how-
ever, when the ordinance involves municipality-wide issues.
18. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Arnel Dev. Corp. v. City of Costa Mesa, 98 Cal. App. 3d 567, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1979).
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In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,II the Supreme
Court recently issued a highly simplistic opinion in which they
held that city wide small lot rezoning referenda classified as legis-
lative under Ohio law are constitutional. The Court reasoned
that because all power derives from the people, "[a] referendum
... cannot be characterized as a delegation of power."
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has held that the use of
initiatives and referenda to enact growth management plans do
not violate a landowner's right to due process. 2
City of Eastlake has sparked a great deal of criticism, but no
coherent theory of the proper method of making collective choices
has emerged. Those who think that local government officials are
either incompetent or corrupt support referenda as a means of
cleansing the political process." Those who have been influenced
by a generation of studies on voter irrationality argue that the
reformers are wrong." Finally, those who want more low and
moderate housing to be constructed assert, with little foundation,
that landowners have a fundamental right to have zoning decisions
made by representative bodies.25 In short, the traditional legal
analysis of consent ordinances and referenda yields little in the
way of satisfying theory either to explain the cases or to suggest
a coherent approach to the problem of deciding when direct neigh-
borhood control over the entry of new land uses should be allowed.
III.
PUBLIC CHOICE APPLIED
Those of us who are interested in applying economic analysis
to public allocation choices have been greatly influenced by
Buchanan and Tullock's The Calculus of Consent.26 This pioneer-
ing work has spawned the public choice school of policy analysis
based on the premise that people behave no differently in making
political choices from the way that they do in making more tradi-
21. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
22. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d
473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
23. See Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CAiu.
L. REv. 74 (1976).
24. Gelman, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting
Processes, 6 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97 (1977), and Note, The Proper
Use of Referenda in Rezoning, 29 STAN. L. Rnv. 819 (1977).
25. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Shelden, and City of East-
lake v. Forest City Enterprises, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1375 (1978).
26. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CoNsEr (1962).
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tional economic transactions (the purchase of a new shirt, for
example). Public choice proponents must acknowledge that this
premise is a bitter one to many, and recently, some of the best
minds in the legal academic community have begun to deny the
relevance of public choice analysis, except as an academic exer-
cise, because of its explicit economic underpinnings.
Although public choice theory is designed to explain only why
people engage in collective action through the political process
and to suggest appropriate decision making units, many people
are likely to be repulsed by it, believing that if we admit that
people are entitled to individualized gains from collective action
something is wrongfully being sold. In Dflrrenmatt's Der Besuch
Der Alten Dame (The Visit), a woman returns to the place of her
birth as the richest woman in the world. Earlier in life, she had
borne an illegitimate child and had lost her paternity suit when
the father bribed two witnesses to say that she had slept with them,
rather than with the father. She comes, like Medea, to seek revenge
for the injustice, offering to give the town and its residents a bil-
lion dollars on one condition: "Ich gebe euch eine Milliarde and
kaufe mir dafiir die Gerechtigkeit" (I will give you a billion dollars
.and with it I will buy the law).2" She requests the death of her
ex-lover. When the mayor responds that one cannot buy the law,
she silences the moral outrage at selling public rights by simply
observing "mann kann alles kaufen" (one can buy everything).
It is perhaps the need to reject the view that the political process
is a market place that leads to a rejection of public choice theory.
Nonetheless, I argue that public choice theory, properly under-
stood, is a superior method of analyzing the consent ordinance
and referenda problem.
Proponents of public choice theory argue that people participate
in the political process to purchase public goods; goods that are
not provided through the market, even though a demand for them
exists. The inability of an investor to capture a substantial portion
of the benefits of the investment results in a lack of incentive for
private production of the good.
Zoning ordinances allow private property owners to capture
the amenity level of an area through the recognition of public
property rights. An individual chooses the highest ranked good or
combination of goods as dictated by his own utility function. In
27. F. DiIRRENMATT, DER BESUCH DER ALTEN DAME, 53 (P.K. Nehermann
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short, collective action is simply an exchange process-organized
to compensate for the presence of transaction costs which would
prohibit the production of certain goods through the market pro-
cess-where it is logical to assume that the individual expects his
resource position will be enhanced as a result of the trade. Thus,
there is a prima facie case for arguing that the efficient allocation
of resources ought to be the result of collective action except in
situations where there is a clear consensus that non-efficiency reasons
such as the redistribution of wealth are the purpose of the enterprise.
Another reason for the resistance to public choice theory is that
it runs counter to the current fashion in jurisprudence. Public
choice theory rejects the organic theory of the state, but many
younger scholars have been influenced either by Marxism or the
related thinking of 19th century Romantic German thinkers who
saw the law and the state as the embodiment of the spirit of the
people. This view rejects veneration of efficiency in favor of higher
community values. For example, Professor Michelman has re-
cently argued that the proper role of efficiency is limited to "a tie
breaker lying at the bottom of a hierarchy of norms, a considera-
tion to fall back on when no superior principles of justice, fair-
ness, equality, reciprocity, altruism, or whatever, succeeds in
ranking the competing claims of the parties." 2 It would lead me
too far afield to probe the different meanings of economic analysis
of the law or the truly large question which seems to engage many
people today (as it should) of where Kant and Hegel actually lead
us. For me these theories are troubling, and I approach the ques-
tion of voter participation zoning from the assumption that the
purpose of a zoning ordinance is to produce an efficient allocation
of property rights, in a good that I will call an "amenity level,"
and that the best rule is the one that minimizes the risk of ineffi-
ciency by insuring that all legitimate property claims are considered
in the efficiency calculus.
My analysis of this problem focuses first on the problem of
small parcel zoning changes. Like all economic analysis, it starts
from an ideal. A theory of rational market behavior posits that a
unanimity rule is the most consistent with self-interest and, of
course, the Pareto principle because only this rule "will insure
that all external effects will be eliminated by collectivation." 2 9
28. See Michelman, Norms and Norinativity in the Economic Theory of Law,
62 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1047 (1979).
29. J. BucHA A & G. TULLOCK, supra note 21, at 89.
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Under this rule, consent ordinances could be seen as neutral if the
transaction costs of obtaining consent are small due to the size of
the area. In effect, the new entrant is in the position of a person
trying to establish a common plan of equitable servitudes. If, how-
ever, transaction costs are high and bribes are not permitted, then
the courts which strike down consent ordinances as invalid dele-
gations of power to private parties on due process grounds are on
the correct track because it can be argued that the legislative pro-
cess is a better method of insuring efficiency. This argument in
turn is premised on the economic and other merits of the legisla-
tive process as an opportunity for bargains to be struck among
competing parties.
A major benefit of the use of economic analysis is that it can
reveal alternatives to the present solutions offered by the law and
the courts which must choose among a limited class of rules and
cannot devise institutional solutions. One such solution is pro-
posed in Nicolaus Tideman's Ph.D. thesis written at the University
of Chicago.3" Professor Tideman studied the frequency and geo-
graphical location of zoning protests in small rezonings and special
use applications in Skokie, Illinois. He found a correlation be-
tween proximity and protest; specifically that the probability of
participation in a hearing declines by one half for every 79 feet.
This led him to propose a system of voted compensation. "A per-
son proposing a change in land use of a type thought. to have
significant direct effects would propose a constant of propor-
tionality for the compensation function."'" The scheme would be
that the area would be defined as that area where the effects would
be greater than 0.1 percent of the property value. Votes would be
weighted by estimated effects and, if a majority approved, the
change would be permitted. The beauty of the Tideman solution
is that the appealing democratic idea of consent ordinances, in
which people directly express their preferences, can be combined
with efficiency promoting constraints to insure that voting schemes
simply do not become an occasion for one group to shift the costs
of amenity production to another group.
The recommendations of Tideman have recently been echoed
in a much more general analysis. Robert Nelson concludes, as have
many other scholars influenced by welfare economics, that a
30. T. Tideman, Three Approaches to Improving Urban Land Use (1969)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis).
31. Id. at 49.
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zoning ordinance should be conceptualized explicitly as the recog-
nition of collective property rights "administered by local legisla-
tures acting virtually as trustees for neighborhood residents. ' " '
This perspective is a useful starting point to examine the concern
about the poor performance of zoning in accommodating change
demanded by the market. Most observers of the process have
concluded that the fault lies with those in charge of the process.
Until recently, many students of the administrative process ad-
hered to the general theory that the remedy for widespread dis-
satisfaction with administrative regulation was to recruit better
people rather than to examine the rationale for the regulation.
This simplistic notion has now been rejected in the face of the
evidence, and the focus on those governing the zoning process has
been replaced with a more powerful structural explanation of the
failure of the process. Nelson and others have argued that the poor
performance of zoning results because zoning is only the defacto
recognition of collective property rights, lacking the most important
dejure characteristic of a property rights system-alienability. The
lack of alienability "has created a major obstacle to necessary and
desirable transitions in the type of basic land use in neighborhoods
and communities and has frequently forced that transition even-
tually to occur through extralegal means."" The introduction
of voting schemes with guaranteed compensation can cure the due
process problems which exist when the power to control zoning
change is delegated directly to neighborhood residents.
Professor Frank Michelman has recently criticized the public
choice model both as a positive explanation of judicial behavior
and as a normative method of collective decision making, but his
criticism is not wholly convincing." He prefers a community
choice model to the public choice model. Community choice
allows communities to define their values, unconstrained by effi-
ciency requirements, through public debate and the electoral
process. As Professor Michelman points out, the model has deep
roots in Western political theory. The problem that I have with
32. R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERI-
CAN SYSTEM OF LAND-UsE REGULATION 19 (1977).
33. See also Fischel, Externalities and Zoning, 35 PUB. CHOICE 37 (1980).
34. See Michelman, supra note 23; and Michelman, Political Markets and
Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Govern-
ment Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78). See also the chilling model of the
new corporate city presented in Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 1057 (1980).
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the model is that the smaller the decision making unit to which
unconstrained community choice is applied, the greater is the risk
that the community will not take into account the relevant costs
of the decision. Tyranny of minorities and inefficiency are the two
most obvious relevant costs which history suggests are likely to be
ignored. The community choice model takes on greater force as
the size of the decision-making unit increases, as constraints begin
to operate which are consistent with the public choice model,
though not required for a legitimate community choice decision.I
Thus, the California Supreme Court opinion upholding the right
of a community to adopt a growth management plan through the
use of the initiative and referendum36 is a harder case to criticize
from a public choice standpoint than is City of Eastlake, which
involved a small lot rezoning. The introduction of the possibility
of nonefficiency principles, as one moves up the scale of decision
making units, introduces a messy complication to my analysis, but
it is the kind of complication with which the law must deal.
35. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
36. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d
473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
